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Abstract
This paper introduces the 2018 wave of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS),
previously fielded in 1998, 2006, and 2012. These publicly-available longitudinal data are
nationally representative, tracking both households and individuals over two decades. In this
paper, we describe key characteristics of the 2018 wave, including sampling, fielding, and
questionnaire design. We examine patterns of attrition and present the construction of weights
designed to correct for attrition, as well as to ensure the sample remains nationally
representative. We compare the ELMPS data to other Egyptian data sources, namely the 2017
Census and various rounds of the Labor Force Survey. The data provide important new
insights into Egypt’s labor market, economy, and society.
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1. Introduction
The 2018 wave of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) is the fourth wave of a
longitudinal survey carried out by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with the
Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).5 The 2018 wave
follows previous waves in 1998, 2006 and 2012.6 Over its twenty-year history, the ELMPS has
become the mainstay of labor market and human development research in Egypt and has served
as a model for similar longitudinal surveys in Jordan (2010 and 2016) and Tunisia (2014).
ERF is committed to publicly available microdata. The ELMPS 2018 data, harmonized with
previous waves of the ELMPS and the October 1988 Special Round of the Egypt Labor Force
Survey, as well as the JLMPS 2010 and 2016 and TLMPS 2014 waves, are publicly available
through ERF’s Open Access Microdata Initiative (OAMDI) at www.erfdataportal.com, as of
October 25, 2019. Data are available to researchers and for academic uses.
As some of the few publicly available, nationally-representative microdata sources on labor
markets and human development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the ERF
labor market panel surveys (LMPSs) have served as the primary data sources for a large number
of academic and policy studies. These include studies of education and life course transitions
(Assaad, Binzel, & Gadallah, 2010; Assaad & Krafft, 2015a; Biltagy, 2012; Heyne & Gebel,
2016); inequality (Assaad et al. 2018; Belhaj Hassine 2011; Hendy 2013); migration and return
migration (Bertoli and Marchetta 2015; Binzel and Assaad 2011; Marchetta and Ferrand 2013;
Wahba 2015a); women and work (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Crandall, Vanderende, Fai, Dodell, &
Yount, 2016; El-Hamidi & Said, 2014; Miyata & Yamada, 2017); and work informality and job
quality (Assaad & Wahba, 2015; Barsoum, 2015; Radchenko, 2014; Selwaness & Zaki, 2017), to
name only a few of the topics studied. The panel design of the survey offers substantial advantages
over pooled cross sectional data by allowing for a more accurate assessment of change over time
that controls for both observable and unobservable individual and household characteristics. It also
allows for a unique perspective on life course transitions by allowing researchers to link life course
outcomes like education, marriage, child-bearing, migration, and employment to the individual’s
household characteristics during childhood and adolescence.
The surveys have supported not only peer-reviewed academic research but also several edited
volumes targeted at broad audiences and published by ERF in cooperation with top international
publishers (Assaad 2009, 2002; Assaad and Boughzala 2018; Assaad and Krafft 2015b; Krafft and
Assaad 2019). They also served as a the primary data source for a number of policy discussions
and reports (Krafft and Assaad 2015; World Bank 2013a; b). The LMPSs complement the official
quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS), with a less frequent, but much richer source of longitudinal
data covering a far wider variety of topics and covering them in greater depth.
As a longitudinal survey, the ELMPS attempts to track households included in the previous waves
and interview all their remaining and new members. The survey also tries to locate any individuals
who may have split from these households between waves, and attempts to interview them, as well
as any other individuals found in the households they formed or joined. In every wave of the
survey, a refresher sample of 2,000-3,000 households is added to maintain the representativeness
ERF received generous support from a number of donors to undertake the 2018 wave of the ELMPS. These include
the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, Agence Française de Développement, UN Women, and the
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.
6 For additional information on the Tunisia Labor Market Panel Survey (TLMPS) 2014, see Assaad, Krafft, and
Ghazouani (2016). For additional information on the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) 2010, see Assaad
(2014). For more information on JLMPS 2016, see Krafft and Assaad (2018).
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of the overall sample and to allow for a more in-depth examination of phenomena of interest. For
instance, the refresher sample of the 2012 wave of the ELMPS oversampled high-migration areas
to allow for a more detailed examination of the patterns and effects of international migration from
Egypt (Assaad and Krafft 2013; Binzel and Assaad 2011; El-Mallakh and Wahba 2017; Wahba
2015b). The 2016 wave of the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) added a 3,000
household refresher sample that oversampled neighborhoods with a high proportion of nonJordanian households to allow for an in-depth examinations of the effects of the Syrian refugee
influx on Jordanian society and the situation of migrants and refugees in Jordan (Al-Hawarin,
Assaad, and Elsayed 2018; Assaad, Ginn, and Saleh 2018; El-Mallakh and Wahba 2018; Fallah,
Krafft, and Wahba 2019; Krafft and Assaad 2018; Malaeb and Wahba 2018). The focus we
selected for the 2018 wave of the ELMPS was economic vulnerability among Egypt’s poorest
communities. Accordingly, we added a refresher sample of 2,000 households that oversampled
rural communities that were among the “1,000 poorest villages” of Egypt, as ascertained by the
most recent national poverty map available to us.7
The final sample included 15,746 households and 61,231 individuals. Of these households, 13,793
households included members from 2012 (10,042 panel and 3,751 split households) and 1,953
were refresher households. Among individuals, 53,040 were in households that included at least
one individual interviewed in 2012 (i.e., either panel or split households), while 8,191 were in
refresher households. Of the 49,186 individuals included in the 2012 sample, 39,153 (79.6%) were
successfully re-interviewed in 2018. Of the 37,140 individuals in the 2006 sample, 22,901 (61.7%)
were successfully tracked over three waves. Finally, of the 23,997 individuals included in the 1998
wave, 10,145 (42.3%) were successfully tracked over four waves. We present a detailed discussion
of sample attrition patterns in Section 2 and the creation of weights to address such attrition in
Section 3. We also discuss the design of the refresher sample and the calculation of the weights
for it. In the subsequent section, we compare the (weighted) results of the ELMPS on key
demographic and labor market indicators to those of other data sources, namely Egypt’s 2017
Census and various rounds of the LFS. First, however, we discuss the design of the questionnaires,
sample, and fielding practices.
2. Data collection and sample attrition
2.1. Questionnaires
Each wave of the survey attempts to maintain consistency for the indicators measured in previous
waves while adding additional modules and questions to examine new issues or allow more indepth examination of existing issues. Accordingly, the 2018 wave devoted more attention to the
measurement of the instability of employment, focusing in particular on job turnover among casual
workers. It also provided more detailed information on health, gender role attitudes, food security,
hazardous work, community infrastructure and the cost of housing. It incorporated specific
questions on vulnerability, coping strategies and access to social safety net programs.
The 2018 wave has two primary questionnaires, a household questionnaire and an individual
questionnaire. The modules in these two questionnaires are listed in Table 1. They are for the most
part the same as those in the previous waves of the survey with a few exceptions. The “tracking
splits” module in the household questionnaire allows interviewers to ascertain whether the
composition of the household has changed since the 2012 wave and inquire about new members
present in the household as well as those who may have split to form new households. The “shocks
We used the 2013 poverty map, based on the 2012/2013 HIECS and 2006 Census (with projected population
numbers) prepared by CAPMAS in cooperation with the World Bank and UNDP.
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and coping module” is also new in the 2018 wave and enquires about both idiosyncratic and
community level shocks that the household may have been exposed to, household food security,
and coping mechanisms that the household may have used to respond to shocks. The main changes
in the individual questionnaire relative to the 2012 wave were a substantial expansion of the health
module, a reconfiguration of the labor market history module to better capture past periods of nonemployment8 and the addition of a module on attitudes.
Table 1. Questionnaire modules
Household
• Statistical Identification
• Tracking Splits
• Individual Roster
• Housing Information
• Current Migrants
• Transfers from Individuals
• Other Sources of Income
•
•
•
•

Shocks and Coping
Household Non-Farm Activities
Agriculture Assets: Lands
Agriculture
Assets:
Livestock/Poultry
Agriculture Assets: Equipment
Agricultural Crops
Other Agricultural Income

Individual
• Statistical Identification
• Residential Mobility
• Father’s Characteristics
• Mother’s Characteristics
• Siblings
• Health
• Education
• Past Seven Days Subsistence & Domestic
Work
• Employment in the Past Seven Days
• Unemployment

• Employment in the Past Three Months
•
• Characteristics of Main Job
•
• Secondary Job
•
• Labor Market History
• Marriage
• Fertility
• Female Employment
• Earnings
• Earnings in Secondary Job
• Return Migration
• Information Technology
• Savings & Borrowing
• Attitudes
Source: Authors’ construction based on ELMPS 2018 questionnaire
2.2. Data collection
Data collection was tablet-based. The ODK-X (previously named ODK2) tools were used, given
their ability to easily handle hierarchical data structures, such as multiple births to individuals
within households, and validate across these different structures (Brunette et al. 2017). A training
of the trainers was held at CAPMAS in January 2018. Enumerators were trained in April 2018,
and data collection began in end-April. The bulk of data collection finished by July 2018, but some
teams continued to collect data until November 2018 in order to complete the sample. For
fieldwork, teams were governorate-based and composed of a supervisor and from three to five
See Assaad, Krafft, and Yassin (2018) for a discussion of ways to improve the collection of retrospective labor
market data.
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enumerators (numbers varied depending on the sample size in the governorate). All enumerators
were women.
Based on experience from past surveys, we eschewed a distinct enumeration round (a phase of
locating and listing individuals interviewed in the previous wave prior to fielding). From our
experience in the 2012 wave, we found that the data from the enumeration phase could not simply
be used directly in fielding, as individuals may have split between enumeration and fielding, and
locating households twice added to cost, time, and attrition. In fielding the ELMPS 2012, 1,680
individuals who were enumerated in 2011 were simply not found in the main fieldwork phase in
2012, and we lacked information on whether they split together, died, moved abroad, or otherwise
(Assaad and Krafft 2013). A similar problem arose in Jordan in 2016, where, although we designed
the questionnaire to track splits at fielding as well as enumeration, many such splits were not
actually fielded, leading to the loss of 616 split households and 647 individuals from the sample
(Krafft and Assaad 2018).9 Instead of implementing a separate enumeration phase, data on the
status of all 2012 members was collected as part of the main fieldwork in 2018. We processed the
data regularly (multiple times per week) throughout fielding to extract split households that needed
to be tracked and added them to the server database for fielding. This dynamic process also allowed
us to track repeat splits, i.e., cases where individuals split together, but once located, were found
to have further sub-divided into additional new households.
During fieldwork, field quality control took place. We undertook an innovative quality control
process where, rather than asking the quality control teams to entirely re-do certain questionnaires,
we randomly deleted a certain number of modules from a sample of completed questionnaires and
asked the quality control teams to repeat the data collection for those modules. More critical
modules had a higher probability of being selected for deletion. For example, we took a 5%
deletion rate on section 4.0, which covers assets and housing characteristics, as these questions
primarily have yes/no answers and presented fewer data quality challenges. More central modules,
such as unemployment detection, were assigned a higher probability of deletion. Because certain
variables such as economic activities and occupations were entered in text form and post-coded at
the office, this provided a further opportunity for quality control by checking for inconsistencies
and possible data entry errors.
2.3. The 2012 sample: Attrition from 2012 to 2018
A key goal of the ELMPS 2018 was to track ELMPS 2012 households and all their members, in
order to be able to generate a panel of households and individuals (a panel which now spans 1998,
2006, 2012, and 2018). Two types of attrition could occur during this process. First, entire
households who were included in 2012 might be lost in 2018. We refer to the loss of entire
households as Type I attrition. If a 2012 household was found, some of its members may have left
to form a split household (for example, young persons may marry and leave their natal household
to form a new household). Although fieldworkers collected as much information as possible from
the original 2012 household (as located in 2018) in order to locate split households, sometimes
split households could not be located. We refer to the loss of a split household as Type II attrition.
In this section, we describe and then model these two types of attrition. We then use these models
to estimate the predicted probability of each type of attrition as a function of 2012 observable
characteristics and use these probabilities to create weights to correct for attrition, as detailed in
Section 3 below.
The repetition of enumeration in fielding did allow us to determine that 208 individuals had naturally attrited, i.e.
died, migrated, or moved to group housing between enumeration and fielding (Krafft and Assaad 2018).
9
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2.3.1. Attrition of entire households (Type I attrition)
Table 2 presents the status of the households from the 2012 wave in 2018. There were 12,060
households fielded in 2012. Of these, 10,042 (83.3%) were located in 2018; they may have been
located in a different location or with a different composition, but at least one of their 2012
members was found. Among the 2012 households that were not located in 2018, data was collected
from neighbors, if possible, on the disposition of the household. For 188 households, we know that
the entire household died out. For another 64 households, we know the entire household left the
country.10 We refer to these two groups of households (252 or 2.1% of the original 2012
households) as having naturally attrited. If we had been drawing a completely new sample, they
could not have been included. Thus, these households are excluded from the sample when
modelling attrition or calculating the Type I attrition rate.
Table 2. Status of 2012 households in 2018
Initial households
Household located
Natural attrition
Household died out
Household left the country
Type I attrition
Household refused
Household found but not completed
Household not found
Type I attrition rate
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012 and 2018

Number
12,060
10,042
252
188
64
1,766
204
291
1,271

Percentage
100.0
83.3
2.1
1.6
0.5
14.6
1.7
2.4
10.5
15.0

Type I attrition occurs when a 2012 household was not found or refused to respond in 2018, since
(to the best of our knowledge) they should have been included in the sample and were not. Some
204 households refused (1.7% of the initial households) and a further 291 were found but could
not be successfully completed (2.4%). A further 1,271 households were not found at all (10.5% of
original 2012 households). Together, 1,766 households attrited. After excluding natural attrition,
this results in a Type I attrition rate of 15.0%.
This 15.0% Type I attrition rate represents an improvement compared to previous rounds of the
ELMPS and the JLMPS. For example, in ELMPS 2006 the Type I attrition rate was 23.5%, in
ELMPS 2012 it was 17.3%, and in JLMPS 2016 it was 38.1% (Assaad and Krafft 2013; Barsoum
2009; Krafft and Assaad 2018). Besides the dedication of the fielding team, we attribute this lower
rate of attrition to integrating the enumeration step with the main fieldwork, since in both past
JLMPS and ELMPSs additional households were lost between enumeration and fielding (Assaad
and Krafft 2013; Krafft and Assaad 2018).
We present our model of Type I attrition in Table 3. We present odds ratios from a logit model
that includes 2012 characteristics (since only households who did not attrite would have 2018
characteristics) on the 2012 household sample, excluding households that experienced natural
attrition. Characteristics include household composition, location (governorate fully interacted
with urban/rural), housing type, and 2012 household head characteristics (age, sex, marital status,
sex-marital status interaction, education, and labor market status), and household wealth quintile.
Importantly, the model indicates the extent to which attrition was random versus related to
10
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observable household characteristics (and thus suggests, although does not calculate, the
relationship with unobservables as well). Overall, the pseudo R-squared of the model is moderate,
12.2%, indicating that while 2012 household characteristics do predict Type I attrition, they do so
only to a modest extent. As a point of comparison, the JLMPS 2016 Type I model pseudo Rsquared was 14.7% (Krafft and Assaad 2018).
Table 3. Type I attrition logit model: odds ratios for probability of attrition
Number of household members
No. of Children 0-5 in HH

0.938
(0.037)
0.859***
(0.032)
0.833***
(0.040)
0.918
(0.045)
0.595**
(0.095)
0.693**
(0.090)

No. of Children 6-14 in HH
No. of Males 15-64 in HH
No. of Females 15-64 in HH
No. of Males 65+ in HH
No. of Females 65+ in HH
Single sex households (mixed sex omit.)
All male

1.543
(0.454)
1.407*
(0.209)

All female
Governorate (Cairo (urban) omit.)
Alex. # urban

1.811***
(0.197)
0.310**
(0.114)
0.740
(0.156)
0.654
(0.179)
0.517***
(0.098)
0.151***
(0.043)
0.181***
(0.039)
0.628*
(0.114)
0.225***
(0.047)
0.966
(0.168)

Port-Said # urban
Suez # urban
Damietta # urban
Damietta # rural
Dakahlia # urban
Dakahlia # rural
Sharkia # urban
Sharkia # rural
Kalyoubia # urban
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Kalyoubia # rural

0.484***
(0.086)
0.414***
(0.101)
0.251***
(0.054)
0.830
(0.145)
0.219***
(0.048)
0.487**
(0.117)
0.154***
(0.052)
0.287***
(0.074)
0.312***
(0.063)
0.658*
(0.131)
0.223***
(0.052)
0.787
(0.123)
0.657*
(0.117)
0.592**
(0.117)
0.647*
(0.118)
0.681
(0.135)
0.179***
(0.056)
0.314***
(0.079)
0.264***
(0.056)
0.454***
(0.089)
0.417***
(0.083)
0.556**
(0.114)
0.137***
(0.036)

Kafr-Elsheikh # urban
Kafr-Elsheikh # rural
Gharbia # urban
Gharbia # rural
Menoufia # urban
Menoufia # rural
Behera # urban
Behera # rural
Ismailia # urban
Ismailia # rural
Giza # urban
Giza # rural
Beni-Suef # urban
Beni-Suef # rural
Fayoum # urban
Fayoum # rural
Menia # urban
Menia # rural
Asyout # urban
Asyout # rural
Suhag # urban
Suhag # rural
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Qena # urban

0.561*
(0.128)
0.348***
(0.073)
0.404***
(0.099)
0.244***
(0.072)
0.738
(0.266)
0.427
(0.192)

Qena # rural
Aswan # urban
Aswan # rural
Luxur # urban
Luxur # rural
Housing type (own or benefit omit.)
Old rent

1.352***
(0.104)
2.636***
(0.272)

New rent
Head age (<25 omit.)
25-34

0.956
(0.145)
1.012
(0.163)
0.799
(0.138)
0.642*
(0.114)

35-44
45-54
55+
Head sex (male omit.)
Female

0.907
(0.160)

Head marital stat. (married omit.)
Single

0.392**
(0.141)
0.608
(0.265)
1.177
(0.306)

Divorced
Widow(er)
Head marital stat. and sex int.
Female # Single

2.643
(1.384)
2.210
(1.140)
0.778
(0.246)

Female # Divorced
Female # Widow(er)
Head education (illit. omit.)
Reads & Writes

1.049
(0.142)
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Less than Intermediate
Intermediate
Above Intermediate
University

1.037
(0.100)
1.075
(0.100)
0.936
(0.154)
1.326*
(0.146)

Head labor mkt. status (Government
employee omit.)
Out of manpower
1.589**
(0.257)
Out of labor force
0.974
(0.120)
Unemployed.
0.848
(0.191)
Public enterp.
1.133
(0.169)
Priv. formal wage
1.018
(0.113)
Priv. inf. reg. wage
1.065
(0.118)
Priv. irreg. wage
0.872
(0.104)
Employer
0.811
(0.096)
Self-emp./UFW ag.
0.605
(0.181)
Self-emp./UFW non-ag.
0.886
(0.111)
Wealth quintile (poorest omit.)
Second
0.896
(0.090)
Third
0.883
(0.092)
Fourth
1.045
(0.111)
Richest
1.176
(0.136)
Constant
0.564*
(0.129)
Pseudo R-sq.
0.122
N (households)
11808
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012 and 2018
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Examining the specific 2012 characteristics which were predictors of attrition, having more
children aged (as of 2012) 6-14, having more men aged 15-64 as well as 65+, and having more
women aged 65+ significantly decreased the odds of Type I attrition. Single sex, compared to
mixed sex households, had significantly higher odds of attrition with similar odds ratios for all
men and all women, but only the odds ratio for all women was significant. There were significant
geographic differences compared to (all-urban) Cairo; with the exception of a significantly higher
odds of attrition in (all-urban) Alexandria, all other governorate-location combinations had lower,
often significantly so, odds of attrition. Compared to households that owned their house, or had it
as a benefit, in 2012, those who rented had significantly higher odds of attrition, particularly so for
new rent (non-rent-controlled) housing contracts.
Turning to household head characteristics, households with heads 55+ were significantly less
likely to attrite compared to households with heads less than 25, but there were not significant
differences for other age groups. There were not significant differences for female headed
households compared to male. Households headed by single individuals were significantly less
likely to attrite than those for married individuals, although this was true primarily for the reference
category of men; the female and single as well as female and divorced interactions resulted in an
increase in attrition, although not significant. Compared to households with illiterate heads, those
with most other levels of education had a similar probability of attrition, with the exception of
households with university-educated heads, who were more likely to attrite. Most head labor
market statuses were not significantly different from the reference, government employee
category. The exception was a significantly higher probability of attrition for heads who were out
of the manpower basis, meaning heads who were either disabled or 65 years or older.
2.3.2. Attrition of split households (Type II attrition)
Among the 2012 households that were found, some individuals who were present in 2012 may not
have been present in 2018. They may have been absent for a variety of reasons, including splitting
from their original household to form a new household. Table 4 shows the status of individuals
who were present in 2012 households, whose 2012 household was found. Of the 49,186 individuals
present in 2012, 42,340 were in households that were found in 2018. However, only 34,325 of
those individuals were still in their 2012 households in 2018. Of the 8,015 individuals not in their
2012 households, 2,171 were absent due to natural attrition; 1,497 died, 552 emigrated either
outside the governorates covered or outside the country, and 122 moved to group housing and
were thus outside the sampling frame. The remaining 5,844 individuals split to form households
within Egypt.
When individuals split to form new households, sometimes they did so together, for example, if
two brothers left their natal household in Aswan to come work in Cairo and shared a flat. Since
our sampling unit was households, we identified the “split households” composed of individuals
who split together. The 5,844 individuals who split made up 4,598 split households, meaning that,
on average each split involved 1.27 individuals leaving together. Of these split households, 3,751
were found and 847 were not, resulting in a Type II attrition rate of 18.4%. This is a substantial
improvement over the 30.3% rate of ELMPS 2012 or the 50.5% rate in JLMPS 2016 (Assaad and
Krafft 2013; Krafft and Assaad 2018). Even more so than in the case of Type I attrition, we
attribute this reduction in the Type II attrition rate to eliminating enumeration as a separate step in
fieldwork, as we previously lost many splits between enumeration and fielding.
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Table 4. Status of individuals and split households in 2018, conditional on 2012 household
being found
Number Percentage

Individuals present in 2012 in original households found in 2018
42,340
Individuals still in original households in 2018
34,325
Individuals no longer in original households in 2018
8,015
Natural attrition through death and migration or leaving sample frame
2,171
Individuals known to have died
1,497
Individuals who emigrated or left for a gov. outside scope of
survey
552
Individuals who moved to group housing
122
Individual splits to form households within Egypt
5,844
Potential split households (individuals who split together)
4,598
Split households found
3,751
Split households not found (attrited)
847
Type II attrition rate
Individuals from 2012 in split households found
4,828
Individuals from 2012 in split households not found (attrited)
1,016
Total individuals from 2012 who were found
39,153
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012 and 2018

100.0
81.1
18.9
5.1
3.5
1.3
0.3
13.8
81.6
18.4
18.4
82.6
17.4

We present in Table 5 odds ratios from a logit model of Type II attrition, estimated for the sample
of 4,598 split households. The pseudo R-squared for the Type II model, at 22.3%, is higher than
for the Type I attrition model, indicating the loss of split households is less random than households
overall. The determinants we include are characteristics of the 2012 households as well as those
of the “head” (or most senior member) of the split household. While most “split households” were
made up of one individual, the presence of additional household members of all ages and both
sexes predicted a significantly lower probability of attrition. Compared to those that were in
(urban) Cairo, split households were significantly less likely to attrite everywhere else. As in the
case of Type I attrition, splits from households living in “new rent” housing, compared to owned
housing, were significantly more likely to attrite. Compared to heads who were under 15 in 2012
(so would have been under 21 in 2018), those 15-24 in 2012 were significantly less likely to attrite.
Other age groups were not significantly more likely to attrite than the reference category. Femaleheaded households (mostly single women) were significantly less likely to attrite than male-headed
ones. Those split households whose heads were single or divorced/widowed were significantly
less likely to attrite than those who were married in 2012. There were no significant interactions
between the sex of the split household head and their marital status. There were also no significant
differences in attrition by split household head education or labor market status in 2012. There
were significant wealth interactions, splits from households that were in the fourth and especially
richest quintile were more likely to attrite. Overall, Type II attrition appears to be driven more by
demographic and geographic factors than by education or labor market characteristics.
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Table 5. Type II attrition logit model: odds ratios for probability of attrition
Number of household members
No. of Children 0-5 in HH

0.088***
(0.047)
0.002***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.007)
0.032***
(0.021)
0.038**
(0.047)
0.007***
(0.009)

No. of Children 6-14 in HH
No. of Males 15-64 in HH
No. of Females 15-64 in HH
No. of Males 65+ in HH
No. of Females 65+ in HH
Governorate (Cairo (urban) omit.)
Alex. # urban

0.210***
(0.053)
0.012***
(0.012)
0.028***
(0.015)
0.050***
(0.032)
0.083***
(0.034)
0.069***
(0.027)
0.053***
(0.016)
0.122***
(0.045)
0.100***
(0.028)
0.300**
(0.111)
0.094***
(0.032)
0.049***
(0.026)
0.050***
(0.017)
0.172***
(0.058)
0.098***

Port-Said # urban
Suez # urban
Damietta # urban
Damietta # rural
Dakahlia # urban
Dakahlia # rural
Sharkia # urban
Sharkia # rural
Kalyoubia # urban
Kalyoubia # rural
Kafr-Elsheikh # urban
Kafr-Elsheikh # rural
Gharbia # urban
Gharbia # rural
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(0.028)
0.072***
(0.032)
0.082***
(0.033)
0.086***
(0.036)
0.083***
(0.026)
0.123***
(0.043)
0.111***
(0.035)
0.245***
(0.071)
0.348***
(0.102)
0.086***
(0.034)
0.161***
(0.044)
0.015***
(0.011)
0.112***
(0.034)
0.072***
(0.028)
0.061***
(0.017)
0.095***
(0.030)
0.107***
(0.029)
0.050***
(0.021)
0.035***
(0.011)
0.106***
(0.040)
0.086***
(0.023)
0.071***
(0.027)
0.074***
(0.026)
0.199*

Menoufia # urban
Menoufia # rural
Behera # urban
Behera # rural
Ismailia # urban
Ismailia # rural
Giza # urban
Giza # rural
Beni-Suef # urban
Beni-Suef # rural
Fayoum # urban
Fayoum # rural
Menia # urban
Menia # rural
Asyout # urban
Asyout # rural
Suhag # urban
Suhag # rural
Qena # urban
Qena # rural
Aswan # urban
Aswan # rural
Luxor # urban
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(0.146)
0.125***
(0.069)

Luxor # rural
Housing type (own or benefit omit.)
Old rent

1.036
(0.159)
3.021**
(1.190)

New rent
Head age (<15 omit.)
15-24

0.075*
(0.099)
0.079
(0.104)
0.115
(0.151)
0.127
(0.171)

25-34
35-44
45+
Head sex (male omit.)
Female

0.269*
(0.147)

Head marital stat. (married omit.)
Single

0.122***
(0.033)
0.293*
(0.175)

Divorced/Widow(er)
Head marital stat. and sex int.
Female # Single

1.640
(0.526)
0.837
(0.587)

Female # Divorced/Widow(er)
Head education (illit. omit.)
Reads & Writes

1.355
(0.350)
1.131
(0.193)
1.142
(0.201)
1.811
(0.590)
1.498
(0.334)

Less than Intermediate
Intermediate
Above Intermediate
University
Head labor mkt.
employee omit.)
Out of manpower

status

(Government
1.042
(0.832)
1.546

Out of labor force

15

(0.377)
1.668
(0.444)
1.028
(0.498)
1.755
(0.526)
1.618
(0.432)
1.524
(0.432)
1.612
(0.645)
0.677
(0.274)
1.203
(0.408)

Unemployed.
Public enterp.
Priv. formal wage
Priv. inf. reg. wage
Priv. irreg. wage
Employer
Self-emp./UFW ag.
Self-emp./UFW non-ag.
Wealth quintile (poorest omit.)
Second

1.278
(0.174)
Third
1.122
(0.163)
Fourth
1.436*
(0.223)
Richest
2.125***
(0.363)
Constant
7218.760***
(8790.485)
Pseudo R-sq.
0.223
N (households)
4598
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012 and 2018
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. For 46 split households, failures were completely
determined.
2.4. Panel sample
The ELMPS waves track individuals over two decades, including a large number of individuals
who were in multiple waves. Table 6 presents the panel, with an observation being a unique
individual, and shows the number and percentage of individuals in different combinations of
waves, e.g. in 1998 & 2006 & 2012 & 2018 or in 2018 only. There were 10,145 individuals tracked
from 1998 all the way through 2019 (out of 23,997 in the 1998 wave). Since refresher samples
were added in each wave, the number of individuals in multiple waves increases over time. For
instance, there were 12,756 individuals in 2006 & 2012 & 2018 (but not in 1998), who can be
analyzed as a 2006-2018 panel along with the 10,145 individuals in the 1998-2018 panel.
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Table 6. Panel sample, 1998-2018
Attrition from 1998 to 2018

Number
Percentage
In 1998 & 2006 & 2012
3,073
3.6
In 1998 & 2006
4,143
4.8
In 1998 only
6,636
7.7
In 2006 & 2012
2,796
3.2
In 2006 only
4,227
4.9
In 2012 only
4,164
4.8
In 1998 & 2006 & 2012 & 2018
10,145
11.8
In 2006 & 2012 & 2018
12,756
14.8
In 2012 & 2018
16,252
18.8
In 2018 only
22,078
25.6
Total
86,270
100.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 1998-2018
2.5. The 2018 refresher sample
In addition to tracking the households that were present in the 2012 round into 2018, the ELMPS
2018 added a refresher sample. The refresher sample was focused on over-sampling the 1,000
poorest villages in Egypt, as a key theme of the 2018 wave was economic vulnerability. A poverty
map created by CAPMAS in 2013 with the assistance of the World Bank and UNDP was used to
identify the 1,000 poorest villages.11 A stratified random sample was used, with strata defined by
governorate (the first level of administrative geography in Egypt), urban/rural location, and within
rural areas, poor (i.e. among the 1,000 poorest villages) versus non-poor. Table 7 presents the
distribution of the refresher sample clusters across these various strata. It is important to note that
the 1,000 poorest villages were all in rural areas and only in some governorates. We sampled the
poorest villages from all governorates that had them. Likewise, there are no rural areas in Cairo,
Alexandria, Port Said, or Suez. Since the ELMPS sample frame excludes the frontier governorates,
the refresher sample likewise excludes them. Overall, we planned for a refresher sample of 2,000
households distributed over 200 geographic clusters (primary sampling units or PSUs). Of those,
we allocated 60 clusters to urban areas, 100 to poor rural areas, and 40 to non-poor rural areas.
Within strata, sampling was carried out according to the principle of probability proportional to
size.

The 2013 poverty map was never formally published, but was made available to the ELMPS team through
CAPMAS.
11
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Table 7. Refresher sample clusters by governorate, urban/rural location, and poor vs. nonpoor
Urban
Rural
Total
Governorate Poor Non-poor Total Poor Non-poor Total Poor Non-poor Total
Cairo
10
10
10
10
Alexandria
7
7
7
7
Port Said
1
1
1
1
Suez
1
1
1
1
Damietta
1
1
1
1
2
2
Dakhalia
5
5
4
3
7
4
8
12
Sharkia
4
4
3
3
7
7
Kalyoubia
4
4
4
1
5
4
5
9
Kafr-Elsheikh
1
1
1
1
2
2
Gharbia
2
2
2
2
4
4
Menoufia
1
1
4
2
6
4
3
7
Behera
2
2
14
2
16
14
4
18
Ismailia
1
1
1
1
2
2
Giza
7
7
8
2
10
8
9
17
Beni-Suef
1
1
6
1
7
6
2
8
Fayoum
1
1
1
2
3
1
3
4
Menia
1
1
2
3
5
2
4
6
Asyout
3
3
19
4
23
19
7
26
Suhag
2
2
19
4
23
19
6
25
Qena
2
2
15
5
20
15
7
22
Aswan
2
2
3
2
5
3
4
7
Luxor
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
Total
60
60
100
40 140
100
100 200
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2018
Each cluster was designed to sample ten households. A list of 12 households per cluster was
generated in case some households could not be located and ten were to be collected. There was
some non-response. Overall, of a planned 2,000 refresher households, 1,953 were sampled. The
non-response rate ranged from a low of 20% (only two of ten households collected, which
happened in two clusters), followed by three clusters with a rate of 60%, five at 70%, 14 at 80%,
26 at 90%, 117 at 100%, and 16 clusters at 110% along with 17 clusters at 120%, where the
“additional” households were fielded beyond the intended ten. The non-response rate was slightly
higher (response rate of 94.2%) in urban than rural areas, but no other non-response patterns were
discernable.
3. Calculation of Attrition and Sample Weights
In this section, we discuss how the attrition modeling and sampling were incorporated into creating
weights for the sample, to ensure that the data remained nationally representative. The starting
point for weights for the 2018 sample was their household weights in 2012. These weights were
adjusted to account for Type I attrition. The weights of split households were derived from their
2012 households, but account for Type II attrition as well as whether any other households may
have merged (i.e., share adjustment for component households). These weights are the panel

18

weights, which were brought together with the weights for the refresher sample (which were based
on refresher sample design) and then expanded to the national population. This section details all
the specifics of these calculations.12
3.1. Weights for Panel and Split Households
The main idea behind the weights for the panel component of the sample is to generate weights
that weight “up” remaining households whose observable characteristics were similar to those
households that attrited. From the Type I attrition model, we estimate Pr(Ah), the probability of
Type I attrition (attrition of the entire household) for 2012 household h. There may also be splits
from that household; refer to a split household as s. For such households we calculate:
Pr(Ahs)= 1-Pr(h found & s found)
= 1-Pr(h found)*Pr(s found | h found)

(1)

To adjust for attrition among the 2012 households that were found in 2018, we compute a response
adjustment factor, rh, for original households:
1
1 − Pr (𝐴" )

(2)

1
[1 − Pr(𝐴", )] ∗ 𝑐,

(3)

𝑟" =
and rhs for split households:
𝑟", =

where cs is the number of component households. Component households are the number of
originating households in the population (not the sample) that contribute individuals to the new,
split household. For example, when two individuals leave their natal households to get married,
they come from two households that existed in 2012; this would be a case of two component
households. Essentially, this household has “double” the probability of selection and this must be
accounted for in weighting by using a share correction (dividing by component households)
(Himelein 2014). If a split contains only members from a 2012 household or born since 2012, there
is only one component household.13
The calculation of the 2018 weights for 2012 households accounts for both the household weight
in 2012 and attrition. Denote the 2012 weight (whether cross section or panel) as w2012. We
therefore calculate 2018 panel weights as w2018= w2012* rh(s). We normalize the weights (dividing
by the mean weight) to have a mean of one. When we subsequently normalize the refresher
weights, this allows 2012 and refresher households to contribute equally to the sample, on average.
3.2. Weights for refresher sample
In addition to the 2012 sample, the 2018 wave included a refresher sample over-sampling the 1,000
poorest villages. This sub-section describes the creation of the refresher sample weights. These
weights can stand alone, and thus serve as further validation of the full sample, as well as feed into
the 2018 combined sample weights. Since our sampling strategy was a two-stage stratified cluster
sample, sampling households, weights were initially calculated on the household level.

12
13

Notation is as in Krafft & Assaad (2018).
When calculating panel weights rather than wave-specific cross-sectional weights the share correction was omitted.
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Each stratum in governorate g, urban/rural location l, and poor vs non-poor area s is made up of a
certain number of clusters 𝑃2,4,, as indicated in Table 7. Given that each cluster p in the refresher
sample is designed to have 10 households, the total number of households per stratum is given by:
89,:,;

ℎ2,4,, = 6 10
<=>

To account for deviations from the planned 10 households per cluster, we accounted for the cluster
level non-response rate. Households start with a weight, wp, such that they represent the planned
number of households per cluster, based on the observed number of households in the cluster, mp:
𝑤< =

10
𝑚<

(4)

We have population counts from the April 2017 Egyptian Population Census for each of our strata,
which we use to weight our sample. Denote the census count of population in a given stratum as
𝑐2,4,, . We therefore calculate household weights as:
𝑤<,2,4,, = 𝑤<

𝑐2,4,,
ℎ2,4,,

(5)

Using the Population Census to ex-post weight households necessarily generates expansion
weights that yield the same number of households as in the population. However, they do not
necessarily yield the same number of individuals. We also allow for individual non-response
(refusal) as part of the individual consent process (71 individuals in the refresher and 490 in the
panel refused or could not be completed). Individuals would still be listed in the roster, collected
at the household level, but not have the individual interview data. To account for potentially agegroup (e) and sex-specific (x) non-response we calculated an age and sex-specific non-response
rate of rx,e. We then adjusted the household weight by this non-response to get an individual weight,
as:
𝑤<,2,4,,
(6)
𝑤<,2,4,,,A,B =
1 − 𝑟A,B
3.3. Combined sample weights
To combine the refresher and panel samples into a single panel with a unified set of weights, first
we divided the weights in each group (refresher and from 2012) by their means to have a mean of
one. The process for the combined weights follows a very similar structure to the latter part of the
refresher weight construction. If 𝑤
C2,4 is the normalized weight for a household (either refresher or
panel) in a particular governorate-urban/rural location combination, we then calculate the
household combined sample weight as:
𝑐2,4
(7)
𝑤2,4 = 𝑤
C2,4
∑𝑤
C2,4
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Where 𝑐2,4 is the number of households in the 2017 Census for that same governorate-urban/rural
location combination. Again, we allow for sex and age group specific non-response (𝑟A,B ) and
adjust to create individual weights as:
𝑤2,4
(8)
𝑤2,4,A,B =
1 − 𝑟A,B
4. Comparisons with other data sources for Egypt
In this section we compare several demographic and labor market indicators from the ELMPS
waves to other data sources and evaluate the representativeness of the ELMPS data. We use the
LFS rounds from 2001-2018 and Egypt Population Census 201714 as comparators. In examining
age distributions, we also use Egypt’s 2006 Population Census to examine changes over time
(Minnesota Population Center 2018). We obtained the key labor market statistics of LFS 20012007 from the International Labor Organization’s ILOSTAT (ILO 2019) and analyzed the
microdata for 2008-2017.15,16 We used ILOSTAT for years 2001-2007 for two reasons, first
because calculations from the microdata were inconsistent with the published figures, and second
because this time period covered ages 15-64, the focus of our microdata analysis, but subsequently
were 15+. Key labor market indicators were missing for years 2003 and 2004 and unemployment
and thus employment were missing in 2005. In addition, we discuss the published LFS numbers
from the four quarters of 2018 and first two quarters of 2019 (CAPMAS 2019a; b), since the
microdata were not yet publicly available.17
The different surveys have slightly different universes. While the ELMPS covered all of Egypt
except the Frontier governorates, the Census and LFS include the Frontier governorates as well.
The Frontier governorates include Red Sea, El-Wadi El-Gedid, Matrouh and North and South
Sinai. Since these governorates had 1.7% of Egypt’s population in the 2017 Census, we do not
expect this to substantially alter comparability (CAPMAS 2019c).
We first undertake comparisons in terms of demographic characteristics, such as age, household
size, marital status, and education. When we focus on demographic outcomes, we specifically
compare ELMPS 2018 with LFS 2014, LFS 2017, and Census 2017.18 We include two rounds of
the LFS because, as we will show below, we observed a substantial difference in demographic
outcomes starting in LFS 2015 that continued through LFS 2017.
We make use of the LFS to assess and compare labor market outcomes, specifically employment,
unemployment, and labor force participation rates.19 We analyze these outcomes by sex for ages
15-64. We follow the “work for pay or profit” definition of the 19th International Conference of
Labor Statisticians (ILO 2013) to calculate these statistics. This is also referred as the market
definition of employment. Under this definition, if someone worked for at least one hour in the
past week as either a wage worker, employer, self-employed worker, or unpaid family worker,
Based on the published Census report (CAPMAS 2017).
Harmonized LFSs are available from ERF’s OAMDI (OAMDI 2019).
16 Employment rates were missing from the ILOSTAT. We, however, were able to calculate the employment rate (𝑒)
from the labor force participation rate (𝑙) and unemployment rate (𝑢) using the following formula: e=l(1-u).
17 The labor force participation rate and employment rate for year 2018 are for 15+ population. While the numerator
of unemployment rate is total size of unemployed population between ages 15 to 64, the denominator is size of labor
force for 15+ population. We therefore do not include these statistics in our graphs.
18 For additional comparisons of previous waves of the ELMPS, see Assaad and Krafft (2013).
19 We do not compare labor market outcomes with the Census, since previous research has demonstrated that labor
market outcomes are poorly measured in the Census (Assaad 1997).
14
15
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producing goods for market, then that individual was considered to be employed. On the other
hand, if someone was willing to work, had searched for work actively in the preceding three
months, was available to start working in the following two weeks but did not even work for an
hour over the past one week, then that person was considered to be unemployed. A person was
considered to be in the labor force if she or he was employed or unemployed.
We also present the 95 percent confidence intervals (CIs) of each labor market indicator calculated
from the ELMPS. The CIs take into account the contemporaneous cluster and strata of the ELMPS.
Comparing the CIs to other statistics allows us to assess the degree to which any differences in
results are likely to be purely due to sampling variability. In addition, we also separately add the
same statistics for the ELMPS 2018 refresher sample. Since the ELMPS 2018 refresher is an
independent sample, covering the same time frame and using the same questionnaire, fielding
practices, and enumerators, this is a particularly valuable test of whether any differences in results
are due to the panel sample (and potentially attrition).
4.1. Demographic comparisons
In this section, we compare the demographics of ELMPS 2018 to other sources. We start with the
size of the population, and then discuss its household size, age structure, marital status, and
educational attainment.
The 2017 Population Census enumerated 23.1 million households (within the governorates
covered by ELMPS), which contained 93.2 million individuals (48.1 million men and 45.1 million
women). Given the design of the weights, both the overall ELMPS and refresher sample generate
the exact same number of households. From the whole ELMPS sample, when we calculated the
expansion-weighted population numbers, after adjusting for individual non-response, we found
88.6 million individuals (44.0 million men and 44.6 million women). When we calculated the
refresher sample expansion-weighted population numbers, after adjusting for individual nonresponse, we found 91.4 million individuals (45.8 million women and 45.7 million men). Both the
refresher sample and the full sample found fewer individuals, and especially fewer men, than the
Census.
One of the reasons for different numbers of individuals across data sources may be different
definitions of households implemented in the different data sources, an issue observed in ELMPS
2012 as well (Assaad and Krafft 2013). As Figure 1 shows, ELMPS 2018 sampled more
households of one person (11%) than the Census (5%), with the LFSs between the two (8%).
Likewise, while the ELMPS found 16% of households had one individual, the Census found 8%
of households did so, and the LFSs 13-14%. Correspondingly, the Census found 23% of
households had three people, while the ELMPS found 16% and LFSs 13-14%. Likewise, the
Census found more households (27%) were four persons than the ELMPS (20%) or LFSs (2123%). The sampling of households with 5 members or above in ELMPS 2018 was almost identical
to that of the Census.
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Figure 1. Comparison of household size (percentage of households), by 2017/18 data sources

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014 and 2017, ELMPS 2018, and Egypt Population
Census 2017 Table 1-9 (CAPMAS 2017).
Egypt’s population is young and has a well-known “youth bulge,” whereby a decline in mortality
followed by a delayed decline in fertility led to a particularly large youth population (Assaad and
Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Krafft and Assaad 2014; Robinson and El-Zanaty 2006). The youth bulge
were young adults by 2018 (Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019). Figure 2 presents the distribution of
population by five-year age groups for the ELMPS 2018, Census 2017, and LFS 2014 and 2017
rounds. While for ages starting around 40, the data had similar age distributions, at younger ages
they diverged substantially. The ELMPS 2018 and Census 2017 had a similar share of 30-39 yearolds, but the LFS 2014 and 2017 had slightly fewer. The LFS 2017 was strikingly different than
other sources at ages 15-24, showing a large youth bulge at those ages, which was not reflected in
the LFS 2014. The LFS 2014 was somewhat more similar to the ELMPS 2018, with some more
20-24 year-olds and somewhat fewer children under 10. The 2017 Census showed less of a
“trough” at ages 20-24 than the ELMPS, slightly fewer children 5-9, and more 0-4. These different
age compositions are important to keep in mind when considering labor statistics that are strongly
related to age, for instance, unemployment rates.
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Figure 2. Comparison of age distribution (percentage in 5-year age group), by data source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014, 2017, ELMPS 2018, and Egypt Census 2017 Table
1-2 (CAPMAS 2017).
Figure 3 compares the age distribution of the sources in Figure 2 with the 2006 Population Census.
To compare the LFS and ELMPS, we calculate what individuals’ ages would have been in 2006
and exclude those who were born after 2006. Because we only have reports, not microdata, for the
Census 2017, we subtract two age groups (ten years, so off by one year). The spike in ages 15-24
observed above in the LFS is prominent as a spike in ages 5-9 in 2006, and while larger for the
2017 wave, was also visible in the 2014 wave. The 2006 and 2017 censuses also diverged in terms
of the share of the population at younger ages, with the 2017 Census having a higher share from
ages 0-14 in 2006, but not thereafter. Both the Censuses and the ELMPS show a very similar youth
population, starting at 15-19 in 2006. The Census 2006 shows it as a youth bulge, with fewer youth
thereafter, whereas the higher share 0-14 means the bulge is less pronounced in Census 2017.
Overall, the ELMPS 2018 is very consistent with the 2006 Census, and the 2017 Census for ages
15+ (in 2006), but diverged at younger ages.
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Figure 3. Comparison of age distribution, age in 2006 (percentage in 5-year age group), by
data source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014, 2017, ELMPS 2018, and Egypt Census 2017 Table
1-2 (CAPMAS 2017).
Figure 4 presents the distribution of population aged 18 years or older by marital status. ELMPS
2018 and Census 2017 align in terms of the share of the population married (68-69%). ELMPS
found more divorced (2.0%) individuals than the Census (1.2%) and more widowed (8.9% ELMPS
versus 6.4% Census). These variations are similar to those across LFSs. As a result, ELMPS 2018
found fewer never married individuals (20.1%) than the Census 2017 (24.4%), LFS 2014 (24.2%)
or LFS 2017 (32.4%). These differences may, however, be due to differences in the age
composition of each data source, as, for instance, LFS had far more 15-24 year-olds.
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Figure 4. Marital status (percentage of individuals aged 18 years or above), by data source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014 and 2017, ELMPS 2018, and Egypt Census 2017
Table 1-10 (CAPMAS 2017).
Figure 5 presents the distribution of the population aged 10 years or older by educational
attainment and data source. Patterns are generally similar. For instance, ELMPS 2018 sampled
individuals with no certificate (35%) slightly less than the Census (37%). ELMPS found a similar
share of university graduates (13%) as the Census (12%) and more than the LFSs (10%) although
this may be driven by age composition differences. The share in secondary was similar across
ELMPS 2018, Census 2017, and LFS 2017 (28-29%) although LFS 2014 was lower (25%).
Differences were largest in terms of primary and preparatory education, 19% in the Census, 23%
in ELMPS 2018 and LFS 2014, and 27% in LFS 2017.
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Figure 5. Educational attainment (percentage of individuals aged 10 years or above), by data
source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014 and 2017, ELMPS 2018, and Egypt Census 2017
Table 1-3 (CAPMAS 2017).
4.2. Labor market outcome comparisons
In this section we turn to comparisons of labor market outcomes between the ELMPS and LFS.
We first look at trends over time and comparisons across data sources. We then, given some
differences in labor market aggregates as well as demographics, show labor market outcomes by
age and sex, in order to disentangle composition differences from differences in outcomes after
accounting for composition.20
4.2.1. Labor force participation
Figure 6 presents the labor force participation (LFP) rate of the population aged 15-64 years by
sex and in total. The figure includes LFS 2001-2017 rates and the rates and CIs from ELMPS 1998,
2006, 2012, and 2018. While total LFP rose from 1998 to 2006, it plateaued in the late 2000s and
began falling thereafter. The drop in LFP has been particularly pronounced in the LFS in recent
years, dropping from 49% in 2016 to 47% in 2017. The ELMPS 2018 found a similar LFP (47%)
to the 2017 LFS. Since the LFS published statistics are for 15+ they are not directly comparable,
however, comparing the 2018 and first two quarter of 2019 numbers to those of the 2017 LFS
shows a continuing decline in labor force participation rates among ages 15+ (CAPMAS 2019a;
b). Examining results by sex, the ELMPS female LFP rate is a bit below and the male rate a bit
above the trend from the LFS. The ELMPS has historically found higher participation rates than
20

Krafft, Keo, and Assaad (2019) explore patterns of labor supply in detail using the ELMPS.
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the LFS, which may be in part due to the focus on an individual responding him or herself, rather
than using a proxy respondent (Assaad and Krafft 2013). The confidence intervals for women but
not for men and not quite for overall overlap with the full ELMPS point estimates, suggesting that
there may be some small differences in sample.
Figure 6. Labor force participation rate (percentage), by sex and data source, ages 15-64,
1998-2018

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2008-2017, ELMPS 1998-2018. LFS 2001-2007 from
ILOSTAT (ILO 2019).
Figure 7 presents the LFP rate by age, sex and data source. Generally, the pattern for men is similar
across sources. For men, LFS 2017 had a very slightly lower participation rate for ages 15-20 and
a slightly higher participation rate for ages 25 to 45 than ELMPS 2018. In the LFS 2014,
participation was higher for all ages. The pattern across time, from 2014 to 2017 and 2018 shows
a clear decline in participation across ages. For men, differences in overall rates were likely driven
by differences in composition, given how similar patterns are by age. For women, participation
from LFS 2017 was higher than ELMPS 2018 for ages 15-35, while the ELMPS participation rate
was higher than the LFS, but only slightly so, for ages 35 to 60. We return to these differences for
women below, in examining their types of employment.
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Figure 7. Labor force participation rates (percentage) by sex, age and data source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014, 2017, and ELMPS 2018.
Notes: Running mean smoother, bandwidth 0.4.
4.2.2. Employment rates
Figure 8 presents employment rates by data source. Employment rates follow a similar pattern to
LFP rates in rising through approximately 2010 and then declining thereafter (the trend continued
into 2018/19 (CAPMAS 2019a; b)). The decline, particularly among men, is a notable new trend,
although must be interpreted with some caution given the composition patterns by age in the LFS.
The results with the ELMPS 2018 compared to LFS again show similar women’s employment,
slightly higher total employment, and higher men’s employment. The refresher confidence
intervals overlap the full sample point estimates in 2018 for total and women but not for men. For
men’s employment and total employment ELMPS 2006 and 2012 were also higher than LFS.
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Figure 8. Employment rates (percentage) by sex and data source, ages 15-64, 2001-2018

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2008-2017, ELMPS 1998-2018. LFS 2001-2007 from
ILOSTAT (ILO 2019).
In Figure 9, we see that employment rates for men, by age, were very similar in the ELMPS 2018
and LFS 2014 and 2017. The drop in prime-age male employment observed in ELMPS 2018
(Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019) is thus confirmed by other sources. There were only slight
differences with the LFS 2017 having lower youth employment rates for men, and the LFS 2014
higher employment rates for older men. For women, while employment rates at ages 35 and older
were generally similar, with ELMPS 2018 finding slightly more employment at these ages than
LFS 2017, there was again a difference at younger ages in employment rates, with ELMPS 2018
estimating lower employment rates for young women, a point we revisit in examining the nature
of employment, below.
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Figure 9. Employment rates (percentage) by sex, age and data source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014, 2017, and ELMPS 2018.
Notes: Running mean smoother, bandwidth 0.4.
4.2.3. Types of employment
Examining the structure of employment by sex, industry and data source illustrates important
patterns that may explain differences in overall labor market indicators. Figure 10 examines the
structure of employment by industry, specifically comparing agriculture vs. non-agriculture and
employment status (wage vs. non-wage). All data sources agree that the share of workers in
agricultural non-wage work has declined over time. However, when the ELMPS data are
overlapped with the time trends for the LFS, they show different employment statuses and
industries, especially for women in recent years. In particular, recent LFSs have classified far more
women as agricultural wage workers and fewer as agricultural non-wage workers. In general,
fewer individuals were classified as agricultural non-wage workers, especially among women. It
may be that the LFS employment detection questions are picking up more subsistence work as
market work. This phenomenon may explain why more young women were classified as employed
in the LFS than ELMPS.

31

Figure 10. Structure of employment in terms of industry (agriculture vs. non agriculture)
and employment status (wage vs. non-wage), by sex and data source, employed, ages 15 to
64, 2006-2018

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2008-2017 and ELMPS 2006, 2012, and 2018.
Notes: Bars at 2006, 2012, and 2018 from ELMPS.
Figure 11 shows the structure of employment for those employed outside of agriculture, by sex,
comparing data sources. Slightly fewer years of the LFS are included (2008 is excluded) due to
different industry coding systems being used over time. Within non-agricultural activities, the LFS
and ELMPS show similar distributions of employment by industry. Results were most similar
overall and for men, but differences among women may be due to the relatively low employment
rates of women and thus more sampling variability. Women were most likely to be employed in
education, followed by the “other” sector, which includes a number of services. The vast majority
of women were employed within these two sectors. Men were distributed across a wider variety
of sectors, with a rising share in construction particularly.
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Figure 11. Structure of employment by industry, sex, and data source, employed, not in
agriculture, ages 15 to 64, 2006-2018

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2009-2017 and ELMPS 2006, 2012, and 2018.
Note: Trade is “Wholesale and retail trade.” Bars at 2006, 2012, and 2018 from ELMPS.
4.2.4. Unemployment rates
Figure 12 presents unemployment rates by sex and data source. It is important to keep in mind
here that differences in composition as well as employment and unemployment can contribute to
differences in unemployment rates. Unemployment fell from 1998 to the 2000s, and further in the
2006-2008 period, before rising in 2009 and thereafter with the start of the global financial crisis
and Egypt’s 2011 uprising. Since peaking in 2015, unemployment rates have been declining in the
LFS. ELMPS 2018 shows consistently lower unemployment rates than LFS 2017. These rates
were, however, consistent with declines in the 2018 LFS and first two quarters of 2019, which
found overall unemployment dropped from 10.6% in Q1 of 2018 to 9.9% in Q2, 10.0% in Q3,
8.9% in Q4, 8.1% in Q1 of 2019, and 7.5% in Q2 of 2019. The ELMPS 2018 estimate of 8.2%
unemployment overall (8.7% in the refresher sample) is in line with this trend. It is, however,
important to keep in mind that discouraged unemployment – where individuals were ready and
want to work but were not searching – rose between 2012 and 2018 (Krafft, Assaad, and Keo
2019). Women have consistently had higher unemployment rates than men and have experienced
smaller declines in unemployment over time; they also had more growth in discouraged
unemployment (Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019).
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Figure 12. Unemployment rates (percentage) by sex and data source, ages 15-64, 2001-2018

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2008-2017, ELMPS 1998-2018. LFS 2001-2007 from
ILOSTAT (ILO 2019).
Figure 13 examines the unemployment rate by age. Historically, unemployment has been an
educated new entrant phenomenon (Krafft and Assaad 2015; Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019), and
that generally continues to be the case. Here, ELMPS 2018 and LFS 2017 show similar patterns
of women’s unemployment, with only small differences at older ages, while LFS 2014 shows a
higher rate of young women’s unemployment from 15-24. The ELMPS and LFSs both show a rise
in younger (aged 15-19) men’s unemployment, suggesting some shift among men of
unemployment towards the younger and less educated (Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019). LFS 2014
clearly shows higher unemployment among the youngest for both men and women.
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Figure 13. Unemployment rate (percentage) by sex, age and data source

Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2014, 2017, and ELMPS 2018.
Notes: Running mean smoother, bandwidth 0.5.
5. Conclusions
Research and policy depend on high-quality, publicly available data. Particularly in the MENA
region, including Egypt, there are substantial economic and social challenges that can be informed
by high-quality data. Past LMPS and especially ELMPS waves have played a key role in research
and policy; we hope ELMPS 2018 will likewise contribute. Having two decades worth of panel
data is particularly valuable, unique in the region, and rare even globally. The breadth of interlinked topics, spanning from employment to fertility and gender role attitudes, has proved a rich
source for cutting-edge research. As well as maintaining comparability with other waves and
surveys, this wave had an enriched focus on economic vulnerability, a particularly important topic
in Egypt in light of recent economic reforms as well as rising poverty rates (The Economist 2019;
World Bank 2019).
This paper has detailed the key features of the new wave, including the questionnaires, fielding
practices, sampling, attrition, and weighting. We have compared the ELMPS 2018 to other
contemporaneous sources in Egypt, including the LFS rounds and 2017 as well as 2006 Censuses.
On most measures the ELMPS was consistent with other sources, and when differences occurred,
further investigations identified key issues potentially driving differences, such as the high share
of youth in recent LFS waves.
The longitudinal, retrospective, and rich data of the ELMPS have already begun to illustrate
important developments in Egypt’s economy and society, such as fertility, after rising in 20122014, once more decreasing in 2018 (Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019). The rise in non-participation
in the economy (Krafft, Assaad, and Keo 2019), and especially the high and increasing share of
youth not in education nor employment (Amer and Atallah 2019) are concerning developments
which can be better understood through rigorous research using the ELMPS. These are just a few
of the ways ELMPS can contribute to our understanding of Egypt’s economy and society.
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